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INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTAND
TRIBUNALS
Second-Order Linking Principles:
Combining Vertical andHorizontal
Modes of Liability
JENS DAVID OHLIN∗
Abstract
Both the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the Inter-
nationalCriminalCourt (ICC)have struggled to combinevertical andhorizontalmodes of liab-
ility. At the ICTY, the questionhas primarily arisenwithin the context of ‘leadership-level’ joint
criminal enterprises (JCEs) and how to express their relationship with the relevant physical
perpetrators (RPPs) of the crimes. The ICC addressed the issue by combining indirect perpetra-
tion with co-perpetration to form a new mode of liability known as indirect co-perpetration.
The following article argues that these novel combinations – vertical and horizontal modes
of liability – cannot be simply asserted; they must be defended at the level of criminal-law
theory. Unfortunately, courts that have applied indirect co-perpetration have generally failed
to offer this defence and have simply assumed that modes of liability can be combined at
will. In an attempt to offer the needed justiﬁcation, this article starts with the premise that
modes of liability are ‘linking principles’ that link defendants with particular actions, and that
combining these underlying linking principles requires a second-order linking principle. The
most plausible candidate is the personality principle – a basic principle that recognizes the
inherently collective nature of leadership-level groups dedicated to committing international
crimes. Like Roxin’s theories describing the collective organizations that can be used as a form
of indirect perpetration, the personality principle treats the horizontal leadership group as
an organization or group agent whose collective nature potentially justiﬁes the attribution of
vertical modes of liability to all members of the horizontal group. Although this article does
not defend thedoctrine of indirect co-perpetration, it does conclude that combinedvertical and
horizontal modes of liability, whether at the ICTY or ICC, implicitly or covertly rely on some-
thing like the personality principle in order to justify collective attribution to the horizontal
collective.
Keywords
co-perpetration; control theory of perpetration; indirect co-perpetration; indirect perpetration;
JCE; joint criminal enterprise; modes of liability
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1. INTRODUCTION
Onewayof characterizingmodesof liability is to thinkof themas linkingprinciples.
The criminal law is obsessed with linking: linking defendants with particular acts;
linkingcriminals toothercriminals (forpurposesofderivativeorvicarious liability);
linking past decisions with future consequences, either foreseen or unforeseen;
linking punishment with moral desert. In fact, linking principles abound in all
areas of the law, both public law and private law, whenever actions are linked in
some way with legal responsibility. The underlying legal doctrines used to perform
this function are all, in a sense, linking principles.
Modes of liability represent a special kind of linking principle of particular con-
cern to criminal lawyers. Modes of liability form an essential ingredient of the
criminal law’s language of culpability. Although actus reus,mens rea, and attendant
circumstances are important,modes of liability are the glue thatholds it all together.
Without them, defendants are just subjects without predicates.
There is a particular reason for looking atmodes of liability as one speciﬁc variety
of the more general category of linking principles. In the recent development of
the international criminal jurisprudence on collective action, courts and scholars
have started to combine modes of liability, forming new and innovative modes of
liability out of the building blocks of past theories and precedents. While these ad
hoc combinations are often creative solutions to the riddle of collective criminal
action, very little attention has been paid to providing a general account of when
andhowmodes of liability can be combined. By discussingmodes of liabilitywithin
themore general context of linkingprinciples, it is hoped that a general justiﬁcation
for this practice canbeprovided. This general justiﬁcation is a ‘second-order’ linking
principle that will link two ‘ﬁrst-order’ linking principles together.
This article concentrates on one combination of particular importance for inter-
national courts. Inmanycriminal cases, amodeof liability linksone leadership-level
defendant with a vertical organization that extends all the way from the leadership
down to the physical perpetratorswho actually pull the trigger. Then, anothermode
of liability horizontally links the defendant to other political or military leaders,
who might also be convicted for the crimes committed by the physical perpetra-
tors. This general structure of combined vertical–horizontal liability has multiple
instantiations, although the two best-known examples involve joint criminal enter-
prise (JCE), applied primarily by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and other ad hoc tribunals, and indirect co-perpetration applied
by the International Criminal Court (ICC) Pre-Trial Chamber.
Consequently, section 2 of this article will explain how JCE originally obvi-
ated the need for vertical and horizontal combinations, but recent developments
in the doctrine ‘de-linked’ the leadership defendants from the physical perpet-
rators, thus creating the problem of vertical and horizontal linkage that remains
unsolved in ICTY jurisprudence. Section 3will then critically analyse the ICC’s
solution to this problem: the ad hoc combination of vertical indirect perpetration
with horizontal co-perpetration, thus creating the ad hoc combination of indirect
co-perpetration. Particular attention will be paid to the diverse structures that such
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horizontal–vertical combinations can take. Finally, section4will conclude that only
a second-order linking principle – the personality principle – can provide a norm-
ative justiﬁcation for combining vertical and horizontal modes of liability. The
personality principle appeals to the collective nature of the horizontal leadership
group as the basis for a mutual attribution of responsibility for crimes physically
perpetrated by one of the vertical branches.
2. VERTICAL LINKING AT THE ICTY
In an inﬂuential decision, an ICTYTrial Chamber inBr −danin rejected the application
of JCE to the defendant because there was no explicit agreement between the de-
fendant and the relevant physical perpetrators, or what the Trial Chamber referred
to as the RPP.1 In the absence of a direct link between the defendant and the RPP –
in this case the link was deﬁned as an explicit agreement – the Trial Chamber was
unwilling to conclude that the defendant and the RPP were part of the same JCE.2
Furthermore, because therewasnoall-encompassing JCE that includedbothparties,
the defendant could not be vicariously responsible for the actions of the RPP.3
On appeal, there were several ways that this holding might have been reversed.
First, the Appeals Chamber might have simply disagreed on factual grounds; for
example, they could have concluded that there was an explicit agreement between
the defendant and the RPP. Second, the Appeals Chamber could have held that a
court was entitled to infer agreement based on the surrounding circumstances and
the relevant context within which the RPPs were operating.4 However, the Appeals
Chamber held no such thing. The judges charted a third and farmore daring path: it
was not required that the RPP and the defendant belong to the same JCE at all.5
This result did far more than simply eviscerate the ‘explicit-agreement’ require-
ment applied by the Trial Chamber. Had it done only this, the decision would
have had a modest impact on the development of international criminal-law
(ICL) jurisprudence on collective action. Rather, the Appeals Chamber move in
Br −danin resolved the issue by completely removing the defendant from the relevant
1 Prosecutor v. Br −danin, Trial Judgement, Case No. IT-99–36, T.Ch., 1 September 2004, paras. 347–348: ‘The Trial
Chamber in this context emphasizes that for the purposes of establishing individual criminal responsibility
pursuant to the theory of JCE it is not sufﬁcient to prove an understanding or an agreement to commit a
crimebetween theAccused andaperson in chargeor in control of amilitary orparamilitaryunit committing
a crime.’
2 Ibid., para. 347: ‘The Accused can only be held criminally responsible under the mode of liability of JCE
if the Prosecution establishes beyond reasonable doubt that he had an understanding or entered into an
agreement with the Relevant Physical Perpetrators to commit the particular crime eventually perpetrated
or if the crime perpetrated by the Relevant Physical Perpetrators is a natural and foreseeable consequence of
the crime agreed upon by the Accused and the Relevant Physical Perpetrators.’
3 Ibid., para. 351: ‘However, the Trial Chamber is of the view that themere espousal of the Strategic Plan by the
Accused on the one hand andmany of the Relevant Physical Perpetrators on the other hand is not equivalent
to an arrangement between them to commit a concrete crime. Indeed, theAccused and the Relevant Physical
Perpetrators could espouse the Strategic Plan and form a criminal intent to commit crimes with the aim of
implementing the Strategic Plan independently from each other and without having an understanding or
entering into any agreement between them to commit a crime.’
4 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Br −danin, Partly DissentingOpinion of Judge Shahabuddeenin, Appeals Judgement, Case
No. IT-99-36, A.Ch., 3 April 2007, para. 4 (JCE agreement inferred from circumstances), para. 7.
5 Ibid., para. 413.
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JCEs – the only criminal group that encompassed the physical perpetrators and
the original source of the criminal responsibility to be vicariously attributed to the
defendant.6
Although this solved one problem (the issue of the explicit agreement), it opened
up another: namely the question of how to ‘link’ the defendantwith the RPP so as to
justify the attribution of vicarious liability from the RPP to the defendant. Strangely
enough, theBr −daninAppeals Chamber showed little interest in providing a coherent
and unanimous answer to this question,7 preferring instead to leave the matter
to individual justices to discuss in separate concurring opinions,8 thus leaving no
substantial direction for future Trial Chambers in how the doctrinal innovation
should be applied.9
Why would the Appeals Chamber have gone to such lengths to perform this
‘delinking’?10 Perhaps the Appeals Chamber was motivated by a laudable desire to
express a hierarchical difference between the high-level perpetrators, who ought to
be deﬁned as principals, and the RPP, who in some ways resemble accomplices in
so far as their relative culpability is far lower.11 Although a categorical distinction
between principals and accomplices is indeed achieved by this delinking, it comes
at a signiﬁcant cost. The issue of Br −danin’s delinking is especially striking when
one considers that the JCE doctrine was recognized and announced in Tadic´ to
solve this very problem, namely link RPPs with defendants.12 For this reason, it
is no surprise that Judge Cassese, who sat on the Tadic´ Appeals Chamber and is
most associated with the development of the JCE doctrine, referred to the Br −danin
Appeals Chamber decision as ‘excessive’ and concluded that the decision ‘raises
doubts about its consistency with the nullum crimen principle and the principle of
personal responsibility’.13
The resulting state of the jurisprudence, post Br −danin, is best expressed in the
following way. A defendant at the leadership level is a member of a horizontal
6 Ibid., para. 414.
7 Ibid., para. 413, concluding that ‘the existence of this link is a matter to be assessed on a case-by-case basis’
but conceding in a footnote that theAppeals Chamber ‘declines at this time to addresswhether this equating
is still appropriate where the accused is convicted via JCE for crimes committed by a principal perpetrator
who was not part of the JCE, but was used by amember of the JCE’.
8 See Separate Opinion of JudgeMeron in Br −danin, supra note 4, para. 6.
9 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Popovic´ et al., Trial Judgement, Case No. IT-05-88, T.Ch., 10 June 2010, para. 1029: ‘It is
necessary however, that the JCEmember used the non-member to commit the actus reus of a crime that can
be inputed [sic] to thememberof the JCE’. SeealsoProsecutorv.Krajisˇnik,Appeals Judgement,CaseNo. IT-00-39,
A.Ch., paras. 225–226: ‘Factors indicative of such a link include evidence that the JCE member explicitly
or implicitly requested the non-JCE member to commit such a crime or instigated, ordered, encouraged, or
otherwise availed himself of the non-JCEmember to commit the crime.’
10 E. van Sliedregt, ‘System Criminality at the ICTY’, in A. Nollkaemper and H. van der Wilt (eds.), System
Criminality in International Law (2009), 183, at 198.
11 This differential is important. See, e.g., J. D. Ohlin, ‘Commentary on Stakic´, the Co-PerpetratorModel of Joint
Criminal Enterprise’, (2008) 14Annotated Leading Cases of International Tribunals 739, at 739–52; see also K.
J. Heller, The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal Law (2011), 390. See also
Prosecutor v. Kvocˇka et al., Trial Judgement, Case No. IT-98-30/1, T.Ch., 2November 2001, concluding that
JCE doctrine should distinguish between co-perpetrators who share the intent to commit the crime and
accomplices who knowingly contribute to the criminal enterprise.
12 See Prosecutor v. Tadic´, ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgement, Case No. IT-94-1-A (15 July 1999), para. 191.
13 See A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (2008), 195, also calling the decision ‘all the more objectionable’
because the Appeals Chamber noted that JCE applies to ‘large-scale cases’.
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JCE with other co-perpetrators at the leadership level. The crime was physically
committed by the RPP – far below – but the doctrine of JCEwas notused to vertically
link the horizontal JCE with the RPP. For example, Judge Meron suggested that the
link could beprovidedby themodeof liability of ‘ordering’,which is explicitly listed
in Article 7(1) of the Statute,14 and other natural possibilities included the concept
of indirect perpetration or perpetration-by-means.15
Another solution to the problem is to recognize the possibility of subsidiary
or interlinked JCEs.16 The two ideas ought to be distinguished, because the term
‘subsidiary JCE’ is usually used to describe a more speciﬁc JCE that is contained
within a larger, more general JCE.17 For example, a group of individuals might
enter into a general JCE to engage in persecution against a particular ethnic group,
thus constituting a crime against humanity. Within that JCE, there might reside a
more particular JCE where individuals devise a particular system of mistreatment
– say a prison camp or a conﬁned ghetto – in order to actualize that campaign of
persecution.18 The subsidiary JCEwouldnecessarily be closer to the ground than the
more general JCE, and the membership of each would not be co-extensive, though
theywould contain at least one commonmember.19 One can even imagine a tertiary
JCE embedded one level further, involving the treatment of particular detainees at
the camp.
An interlinked JCE is a different idea. Under this model, the doctrine of JCE is
used to link thehorizontalmembers of a JCE at the leadership level, and the doctrine
is also used to vertically link one member of the leadership JCE with mid-level
ofﬁcers and the RPP on the ground. The JCEs intersect because they have at least one
member in common, namely the indirect perpetrator at the leadership level. Under
this model, all members of the leadership level would be vicariously responsible
for the crimes committed by the RPP.20 As Gustafson indicates, the interlinked JCE
model ‘does not require the principal perpetrators to be included within the scope
of a particular JCE, while, at the same time, it provides a method of tracing liability
from these principal perpetrators to higher-level accuseds’.21 However, it is unclear
why the argument does not also work in reverse. If the two interlinked JCEs allow a
court to trace liability up to the leadership level, why do they not also trace liability
back down to the RPP as well? The JCE doctrine mandates that all members of the
enterprise are vicariously responsible for the actions of itsmembers.22 If linking two
14 See Br −danin, supra note 4, para. 6.
15 See ibid., paras. 10–13, expressing concern with Judge Meron’s notion of ordering and also discussing
perpetration through an instrument. Shahabuddeen argued that RPPsweremembers of the JCEbecause they
agreed or acquiesced to it.
16 This solution is proposed in, inter alia, K. Gustafson, ‘The Requirement of an “Express Agreement” for Joint
Criminal Enterprise Liability: A Critique of Br −danin’, (2007) 5 JICJ 134, at 147.
17 Ibid., at 154.
18 See, e.g., A. Strippoli, ‘The Kravica Case at the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, (2009) 7 JICJ 577, at 589.
19 See Gustafson, supra note 16, at 154.
20 A similar doctrine exists in conspiracy law. See, e.g.,Kotteakos v. United States, (1946) 328US 750, at 755;United
States v. Bruno, (1939) 105 F.2 d 921 (2 nd Cir.);United States v. Carpenter, (1986) 791 F.2 d 1024 (2 nd Cir.).
21 See Gustafson, supra note 16, at 155.
22 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Separate andDissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, Appeal Judgement,
Case No. IT-98-32-A, 25 February 2004, para. 31. See also Gustafson, supra note 16, at 146.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 31 Jul 2012 IP address: 128.253.7.19
776 JENS DAVID OHLIN
JCEs allows vicarious responsibility across the interlink, then the argument ought
to work in both directions. At this point, the result conﬂicts with at least one policy
rationale behind the Br −danin delinking, which was to limit the liability of the RPP –
due to their remoteness – by removing them from the JCE. In any event, the ICTY
has so far elected not to solve the Br −danin question by appealing to the notion of
interlinked JCEs.23
But there is a deeper issue raised by the interlinked JCEs. Although each JCE
links multiple individuals together, what justiﬁcation is there for linking the JCEs
together,other thantheexistenceofoneoverlappingmember?Whyshouldcriminal
liability traverse the interlink? This is not to suggest that no justiﬁcation could be
offered. Rather, the point is that some justiﬁcation must be made for this doctrinal
move. The combination of the vertical and horizontal linking principles requires
more than simply referencing the banal fact that both are JCEs, namely that the
vertical and horizontal linking is performed with the samemode of liability.
For the moment, it is not so important which mode of liability is used to per-
form the vertical linking. The important point is that, regardless of which vertical
mode of liability is used, it must be combined with the doctrine of JCE in order to
successfully link the defendant to the RPP. From a purely theoretical standpoint, the
following question is generated: what principle allows one to combine modes of
liability together? The Br −danin Appeals Chamber neither answered nor even asked
this question, but this doctrinal move is one that stands in need of justiﬁcation.
This is especially true given that the Appeals Chamber in Kvocˇka implied that such
combinations of modes of liability were not permitted.24
This problem of how to combinemodes of liability along vertical and horizontal
axes is rarely addressed by international courts. To criminal-law lawyers trained
in the United States, the question is completely novel, since the doctrine of con-
spiracy would generally allow courts to draw a large circle around all participants
in a collective criminal endeavour (whether located on the horizontal or vertical
plane) and declare all of them to be co-conspirators.25 Furthermore, the issue re-
mained similarly unaddressed by the ICTY prior to the Br −danin delinking because
the JCE doctrine allowed Trial Chambers to draw an analogous circle around all
23 Although some scholars have described the Br −danin Appeals Judgement as adopting the interlinked JCE
model, this semantic characterization seems inexact. See, e.g., E. van Sliedregt, ‘Modes of Participation’, in L.
N. Sadat (ed.), Forging a Convention for Crimes against Humanity (2011), 243–4. The Appeals Judgement neither
referred to ‘interlinked’ JCEs nor even suggested that the link between the leadership JCE and the RPP was
established by a JCE. Instead, the Appeals Chamber majority indicated that the link was to be evaluated on
a case-by-case basis, and JudgeMeron suggested ‘ordering’ as the correct mode of liability.
24 See Prosecutor v. Kvocˇka et al., Appeals Judgement, Case No. IT-98-30/1, A.Ch., 28 February 2005, para. 91: ‘The
AppealsChamber emphasizes that joint criminal enterprise is simply ameansof committing a crime; it is not
a crime in itself. Therefore, it would be inaccurate to refer to aiding and abetting a joint criminal enterprise.
The aider and abettor assists the principal perpetrator or perpetrators in committing the crime.’ See also
Prosecutor v. Sˇainovic´ et al., Decision on Ojdanic’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction: Indirect Co-Perpetration,
Case No. IT-05-87, T.Ch., 22March 2006, para. 37.
25 For a discussion of the theoretical basis of the conspiracy doctrine, see J. D. Ohlin, ‘Group Think: The Law
of Conspiracy and Collective Reason’, (2008) 98 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 147 (criticizing
overexpansive nature of conspiracy liability generally and Pinkerton liability speciﬁcally).
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participants in a JCE, regardless of their proximity to the actus reus of the crime. Al-
thoughBr −daninaccomplishedadelinking, the taskof relinkingwasapparently left to
others.
3. INDIRECT CO-PERPETRATION AT THE ICC
In its earliest cases, the ICC has confronted the issue of combining vertical and hori-
zontal modes of liability. The Pre-Trial Chamber famously rejected a ‘mechanical’
application of the ICTY doctrine of JCE, choosing instead to apply Roxin’s control
theory of perpetration in the Lubanga,26 Katanga,27 and Al Bashir cases.28 The schol-
arly literature is repletewith analysis of the ICC’s use of Roxin’s theories.29 However,
amore searching analysis is required of theparticular adhoc combinationof Roxin’s
theories that are used by the ICC.
3.1. An ad hoc combination
For example, in Katanga, the Pre-Trial Chamber combined the doctrine of co-
perpetration (Mitta¨terschaft) with the doctrine of indirect perpetration (Ta¨ter hinter
dem Ta¨ter), thus creating the notion of an indirect co-perpetrator (mittelbare
Mitta¨terschaft).30 This latest concept is a genuinely novel judicial development that
has no basis in Roxin’s original theory, which made no mention of an indirect
co-perpetrator.31 Furthermore, national prosecutions that have relied on Roxin’s
control theory of perpetration, including the Fujimori prosecution,32 the German
Border Guard case,33 and the junta cases,34 did not apply the concept of indir-
ect co-perpetration. Each applied the concept of indirect perpetration through an
26 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Conﬁrmation of the Charges, Pre-Trial Chamber I,
ICC-01/04-01/06, Pt.Ch.I, 29 January 2007, para. 340.
27 Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on Conﬁrmation of Charges, Pre-Trial
Chamber, ICC-01/04-01/07-3269, 30 September 2008, para. 484 (detailing control-over-the-crime approach).
28 Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, Second Arrest Warrant, Pre-Trial Chamber, ICC-02/05-01/09,
12 July 2010, para. 4.
29 See, e.g.,H.Olasolo,TheCriminalResponsibility of Senior Political andMilitaryLeaders as Principals to International
Crimes (2009), 265–6; F. Jessberger and J. Geneuss, ‘On the Application of a Theory of Indirect Perpetration
in Al Bashir: German Doctrine at The Hague?’, (2008) 6 JICJ 853; J. D. Ohlin, ‘Joint Intentions to Commit
InternationalCrimes’, (2011)11 CJIL721,at723;M.Osiel, ‘AscribingIndividualLiabilitywithinaBureaucracy
of Murder’, in A. Smeulers (ed.), Collective Violence and International Criminal Justice (2010), 119–22.
30 See Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, supra note 27, para. 492: ‘Rather, through a combination of
individual responsibility for committing crimes throughother persons togetherwith themutual attribution
among the co-perpetrators at the senior level, a mode of liability arises which allows the Court to assess the
blameworthiness of ‘senior leaders’ adequately.’
31 See, e.g., C. Roxin,Ta¨terschaft undTatherrschaft (1963). Several scholars have described the Pre-Trial Chamber’s
reliance on Roxin’s theory ofOrganisationsherrschaft as ‘controversial’, though usually because of the court’s
reliance on GermanDogmatik in the place of amore traditional analysis of state practice and opinio juris. See,
e.g., N. Jain, ‘The Control Theory of Perpetration in International Criminal Law’, (2011) 12CJIL 157, at 184.
32 Fujimori Judgment, CSJ, Sala Penal Especial, 7 April 2009, Exp.No.AV19-2001, cited inK.Ambos, ‘The Fujimori
Judgment: A President’s Responsibility for Crimes against Humanity as Indirect Perpetrator by Virtue of an
Organized Power Apparatus’, (2011) 9 JICJ 137, at 143, footnote 33.
33 GermanBorderCase, Judgmentof26 July1994 againstFormerMinisterofNationalDefenceKesslerandOthers,
40 BGHSt (1995) 218–40, reprinted in (2011) 9 JICJ 211 (edited by G.Werle and B. Burghardt, translated by B.
Cooper).
34 JuntasTrialCase, Judgmentof 9December1985, translation reprinted in (1987) 26 International LegalMaterials
317, cited and analysed in Olasolo, supra note 29, at 127–9.
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organizational machinery of power.35 Only a few scholars have directly tackled
the question of whether the ad hoc combination of these modes of liability is
appropriate.36
The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber described Katanga as an indirect co-perpetrator be-
causehe controlled, on thevertical axis, amilitia that followedhis orders, buthe also
collaborated on a horizontal directionwith another defendant, Chui, who provided
an essential contribution to the collective effort.37 Neither indirect perpetration nor
co-perpetration, by itself, was sufﬁcient to capture the legal relationships between
the relevant perpetrators because Katanga and Chui controlled separate militias,
each of which committed elements of the overall criminal endeavour. However,
eachmilitia reported to its own commander, perhaps due to the fact that themilitia
were ethnic (or tribal) organizations that could not (orwould not) be integrated into
a single organization.38 One is therefore left with two parallel vertical organizations
that were joined at the leadership level only by virtue of the co-operation between
the co-perpetrators Katanga and Chui.39 In this case, both Katanga and Chui were
indirect perpetrators of their own organizations, though only by co-operating at
the leadership level could their indirect perpetration constitute the war crimes for
which they were indicted.40
Katanga objected to the creation and application of this new mode of liability.41
His argument was buttressed, in part, by the fact that an ICTY Trial Chamber had
explicitly held inMilutinovic´ that indirect co-perpetrationwas not an acceptedmode
of liability under customary international law as of 1992.42 The Pre-Trial Chamber
was left to argue that indirect co-perpetration had a statutory basis because Article
25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute included co-perpetration and indirect perpetration
provisions. But, confronted with the fact that Article 25 says nothing about indirect
co-perpetration, the Pre-Trial Chamber could only muster the following wisp of an
argument:
The Chamber ﬁnds that there are no legal grounds for limiting the joint commission
of the crime solely to cases in which the perpetrators execute a portion of the crime
35 This theory, Organisationsherrschaft, is one version of indirect perpetration. See C. Roxin, ‘Crimes as Part of
Organized Power Structures’ (translated by B. Cooper), (2011) 9 JICJ 193, reprinted fromGoltdammer’s Archiv
fur Strafrecht (1963), 193–207; Roxin, supra note 31, at 244. See also F. C. Schroeder,Der Ta¨ter hinter dem Ta¨ter :
Ein Beitrag zur Lehre von der mittelbaren Ta¨terschaft (1965).
36 For one excellent example, see T. Weigend, ‘Perpetration through an Organization: The Unexpected Career
of a German Legal Concept’, (2011) 9 JICJ 91, at 110–11: ‘The critical issue lies not in joining human tools but
in what it means to “control” their operation.’ See also Olasolo, supra note 29, at 306–30; S. Manacorda and
C. Meloni, ‘Indirect Perpetration versus Joint Criminal Enterprise: Concurring Approaches in the Practice
of International Criminal Law?’, (2011) 9 JICJ 159, at 174: ‘Whether this form of indirect co-perpetration
is recognized by international criminal law remains, however, unclear.’ B. Burghardt and G. Werle, ‘Die
mittelbareMitta¨terschaft–Fortentwicklung deutscher Strafrechtsdogmatik imVo¨lkerstrafrecht?’, in R. Bloy,
Gerechte Strafe und legitimes Strafrecht: Festschrift fu¨r Manfred Maiwald zum 75. Geburtstag (2010), 849–64.
37 SeeGermain Katanga andMathieu Ngudjolo Chui, supra note 27, paras. 543–545.
38 Ibid., para. 493 (referring to ‘ethnical loyalties within the respective organizations’).
39 Ibid., para. 548.
40 Ibid., para. 555 (‘coordinated essential contribution by each co-perpetrator resulting in the realisation of the
objective elements of the crime’).
41 Ibid., para. 474.
42 See Ohlin, supra note 25; Prosecutor v. Sˇainovic´ et al., Decision on Ojdanic’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction:
Indirect Co-Perpetration, Case No. IT-05-87, T.Ch., 22March 2006, para. 37.
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by exercising direct control over it. Rather, through a combination of individual re-
sponsibility for committing crimes through other persons together with the mutual
attribution among the co-perpetrators at the senior level, a mode of liability arises
which allows the Court to assess the blameworthiness of ‘senior leaders’ adequately.43
This statement came right after the Pre-Trial Chamber’s analysis that the text of the
Statute was ambiguous and that the ‘or’ between the co-perpetration and indirect-
perpetration provisions could be read either as an ‘inclusive or’ or as an ‘exclusive
or’.44 It is therefore a bit perplexing that the Pre-Trial Chamber could not conceive of
a single ‘legal ground’ for selecting the ‘exclusive or’ over the ‘inclusive or’. One can
immediately think of an obvious possibility: in favorem vitae, libertatis, et innocentiae
omnia praesumuntur.
There are several different ways in which these cases of indirect co-perpetration
can be manifested. It is important to distinguish them in order to clarify the exact
relationshipbetweenthehorizontalandverticalelements.First, thereis thesituation
that Katanga and Chui allegedly found themselves in: each an indirect perpetrator
who co-operated at the leadership level to combine their militia organizations.
Although members of both militia physically perpetrated the crimes, their vertical
organization remained distinct and unco-ordinated, with the exception of the top-
level co-ordination allegedly provided by Katanga and Chui.45 A second possibility
is the structure described by the Pre-Trial Chamber in the case of Al Bashir, whom
they characterized as collaborating with other high-ranking Sudanese political and
military leaders in ‘directing the branches of the “apparatus” of the State of Sudan
that they led, in a coordinated manner, in order to jointly implement the common
plan’.46 This could be described as a ‘junta model’ if it turns out that the leaders
exercised their control as a group over the vertical branches, rather than exercising
individual control.47
A third possibility involves a horizontal group of military and political leaders
who each control a vertical branch of governmental authority, though only some
of the vertical branches are engaged in the physical commission of the crimes. Both
43 SeeGermain Katanga andMathieu Ngudjolo Chui, supra note 27, para. 492.
44 Ibid., para. 491.
45 Burghardt and Werle label the Katanga and Chui scenario as ‘indirect co-perpetration’ (mittelbare
Mitta¨terschaft) but distinguish it from cases of ‘joint indirect perpetration’ (mittelbare Ta¨terschaft in
Mitta¨terschaft) where the hierarchical organization is controlled by a group instead of a single person.
See Burghardt and Werle, supra note 36, at 863–4. Indeed, the suggestion is helpful because it is unclear
whether the same doctrine can be applied to both situations, which are conceptually distinct.
46 See Prosecutor v. OmarHassanAhmadAl Bashir, Decision on Prosecution’s Application for aWarrant of Arrest
againstOmarHassanAhmadAl Bashir, Pre-Trial Chamber I, ICC-02/05-01/09, Pt.Ch., 4March 2009, para. 216.
47 Cf. Weigend, supra note 36, at 111, referring to this as a ‘junta’ model because ‘there is one group of
subordinates subject to control by a group of leaders working together’; Burghardt and Werle, supra note
36, at 864 (distinguishing group control over an organization as a distinct variant of the doctrine). From the
limited nature of the Pre-Trial Chamber’s description of the state of affairs in Sudan, however, it is unclear
if the Al Bashir ‘junta’ jointly controlled all of the subordinates, or if each leader controlled his or her own
bureaucracy in amanner analogous to Katanga and Chui. There is also a middle position: a president might
have de jure control of all of the subordinates but leave de facto operational and bureaucratic control to
other political andmilitary leaders.
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the Stakic´ and Bemba cases are good examples of this third structure.48 In Stakic´,
the Trial Chamber concluded that the defendant had authority over the civilian
authorities, while his co-perpetrators each had respective control over the civilian
police andmilitaryunits.Although the civilian authoritiesunder Stakic´’s command
did not physically perpetrate any of the crimes, the Trial Chamber concluded that
the civilian police forces andmilitary units under the direction of the other indirect
co-perpetrators couldnothaveperpetrated the crimeswithout the logistical support
of Stakic´’s civilian employees.49 In Bemba, the defendant was accused of being the
commander-in-chief of the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) militia
and of co-perpetrating his crimes with former Central African Republic president
Ange-Fe´lixPatasse´.50 AlthoughPatasse´alsocontrolledahierarchicalpowerstructure
(his Presidential Security Unit), the crimes were physically committed by Bemba’s
troops. Therefore, Patasse´ stood in a position roughly analogous to that of Stakic´,
although it is even less clear whether Patasse´’s subordinates were relevant for the
commission of the crimes carried out by Bemba’s forces.51
As a practical and evidentiarymatter, it might be difﬁcult to distinguish between
the three scenarios. For example, determining whether the control over the ver-
tical branches was exercised by individuals within the leadership group, or by the
group as a whole, depends in part on understanding the relevant power balance
between the horizontal leaders, which might remain inscrutable.52 Furthermore, if
one co-perpetrator belongs to the group but does not control his own independent
hierarchical structure of power, then his liability as a co-perpetrator depends on one
of two legal assessments. Either he co-exercised joint control over another’s vertical
organization, by virtue of the nature of the horizontal collaboration, or he is vicari-
ously liable for the acts of the RPP simply because he co-operated at the leadership
level and belonged to the horizontal group that planned the criminal endeavour.
Although vicarious criminal liability sounds more acceptable in the ﬁrst situation
(joint control), it is not clear how one draws a dividing line between joint control
over a vertical organization and mere membership in a horizontal organization
that includes members that have vertical structures at their disposal. What is the
operative difference?
In these situations, where the defendant does not have his own vertical organ-
ization at his disposal (or members of his vertical organization do not physically
perpetrate the crimes), themode of liability resembles an inverted-L-shaped form of
indirect co-perpetration. Under this scheme, the two defendants at the leadership
48 Prosecutor v. Stakic´, Trial Judgement, IT-97-24, T.Ch., 31 July 2003, para. 469; and Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba
Gombo, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor
against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05 -01/08, P.T.Ch. II, 15 June 2009, para. 370.
49 Stakic´, supra note 48, paras. 482–486.
50 See Jean-Pierre BembaGombo, supranote 48, para. 373. Although the Pre-Trial Chamber continuously referred
to Bemba as a co-perpetrator, their description of his control over MLC troops, as well as his co-perpetration
with former CAR president Angel-Fe´lix Patasse´, suggests that he was an indirect co-perpetrator. See Olasolo,
supra note 29, at 318. The Pre-Trial Chamber’s liberal citations of the Stakic´ Trial Chamber judgement also
support this conclusion. See Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, supra note 48, para. 350, footnote 441.
51 Patasse´ died in April 2011.
52 See H. Vest,Voelkerrechtsverbrecher verfolgen (2011), 428 (discussing horizontal co-operation).
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level would be linked together under the doctrine of co-perpetration, but then one
of the co-perpetrators (or several of them) would be linked vertically to the RPP
through the doctrine of indirect perpetration. After linking the two linking prin-
ciples together, a court would be able to trace a line of responsibility from the RPP
not only to the indirect perpetratorwho controlled them along the vertical axis, but
also to the co-perpetrator at the leadership level who co-operated in some manner
with the indirect perpetrator.53 The result would be an inverted-L-shaped structure
that vicariously attributes responsibility for the actions on the ground to the second
co-perpetrator, based on the concept of indirect co-perpetration.54 In this situation,
the mode of liability of indirect co-perpetration is carrying the entire load of the
argument; it demands some scrutiny from the level of criminal-law theory.
Noneof this is to conclusively suggest, at the outset, that thenotionof indirect co-
perpetration is inappropriate fromthestandpointof criminal-lawtheory, customary
international law,orArticle25of theRomeStatute.55 Rather, thepointof theanalysis
is twofold. First, the ICC’s problem of combining modes of liability is structurally
identical to the ICTY’s problem of linking a leadership-level JCE with the RPP,
which might also produce an inverted-L-shaped mode of liability. In fact, these are
two instantiations of the very same problem. In the case of a leadership-level JCE
prosecuted at the ICTY, it is likely that only one member of the leadership JCE
would vertically direct a criminal or military organization whose members would
then physically perpetrate the war crimes. Then, the political leaders who join the
JCE with the military commander are vicariously responsible for the actions of
the physical perpetrators by tracing their responsibility along an inverted-L-shaped
path. Second, pace the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber, the connection of horizontal and
verticalmodes of liability is a doctrinalmove that requires at least some justiﬁcation,
given that one cannot just combine, willy-nilly, any number of modes of liability at
will.56 There has to be a reason to support the combination.57
Furthermore, the stakes for any particular defendant are immense because the
defendant’s horizontal link to other co-perpetrators at the leadership level might
be established by a mental element that is far lower than shared intent.58 Under
JCE III, the link might be established by knowledge of a consequence that ought to
53 This hypothetical individual could be described as a co-perpetrator or an indirect co-perpetrator. Both
descriptions are equally plausible but both are simultaneously unsatisfactory. The label ‘co-perpetrator’
fails to capture the fact that the vicarious liability is traced upwards along a vertical axis through indirect
perpetration. Second, the label ‘indirect co-perpetrator’ is confusing because the defendant in this scenario
does not have indirect control over any of the RPP.
54 Anexampleof this structurewouldbe theprosecutionof SalazarMonroe inPeru forhis role, at the leadership
level, in crimes committed along with President Fujimori. See Corte Superior de Justicia de Lima, Primera
Sala Penal Especial, Judgment of 8April 2008, Exp. No. Av. 03-2003-18 SPE/CSJLI, pp. 98–110, cited in Ambos,
supra note 32, at 153.
55 There are numerous analyses of Art. 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute. See, e.g.,Manacorda andMeloni, supranote
36, at 167–8 (‘the Rome Statute clearly shows the path to be followed’).
56 In agreement, see Kvocˇka, supra note 24, para. 91.
57 But see E. van Sliedregt, Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Law (2012), Chapter 4, noting
that ‘compound’ or ‘multiple’ participation is permitted under some circumstances in Dutch and German
criminal lawwhen the requirements of bothmodes of liability are met.
58 On the signiﬁcance of shared or joint intentions, see Ohlin, supranote 29, at 742 (applying Bratman’s shared-
intentions theory to international crimes).
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be reasonably foreseeable to the defendant, or what the ICTY has called advertent
recklessness.59 Similarly, under the ICC’s version of indirect co-perpetration, the
relevant mental element can be satisﬁed with dolus eventualis (which the Chamber
and some commentators have equatedwith advertent recklessness).60 Putting aside
for the moment the issue of whether dolus eventualis or advertent recklessness are
appropriate mental elements in this context,61 it is clear that, under the current
case law of the ICTY, a co-perpetrator’s connection at the horizontal level might
be established simply because either he was reckless as to the crimes that might
be committed or he reconciled himself to that possibility.62 The earliest decisions
of the ICC have been split on this issue.63 Furthermore, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber
has even applied the theory when the underlying common plan is non-criminal64
– an element that ironically far exceeds the contours of the common-law mode of
liability known as conspiracy, which as a historical matter all of these doctrines
were meant to supplant.65 Either way, given that the horizontal link to the indirect
perpetrator is often easily established, it is imperative that the doctrine conclusively
justiﬁes the combination of the vertical and horizontal linking principles.
59 Regarding the general acceptability of dolus eventualis as a sufﬁcient mental element, the Stakic´ Appeals
Chamber and Trial Chamber were in complete agreement, despite the fact that the former applied indirect
co-perpetration and the latter applied JCE III. In other words, both doctrines allow the application of a
lower mental state that may have a greater impact on the outcome of the case than the choice of mode of
liability. See Stakic´, supranote 48, para. 587. However, the Trial Chamber did concede that dolus eventualiswas
insufﬁcient for genocide, which requires dolus specialis – ibid., para. 530 – a conclusion that was not accepted
by the Appeals Chamber in that case. See Prosecutor v. Stakic´, Appeal Chamber Judgement, IT-97–24, A.Ch.,
31 July 2003, para. 38 (citing Prosecutor v. Br −danin, Decision on InterlocutoryAppeal, ICTYAppeals Chamber,
Case No. IT-99-36-A (19March 2004), paras. 9–10).
60 See, e.g., Stakic´, supra note 59, paras. 99–103 (equating advertent recklessness with dolus eventualis and
concluding that neither violates the nullem crimen principle); Tadic´, supra note 12, para. 220 (same); Cassese,
supra note 13, at 201. However, several scholars have pointed out that dolus eventualis requires a distinctive
attitude regarding the outcome (approval and identiﬁcation with the evil result) that is not contained in
the common-law concept of recklessness. See, e.g., G. P. Fletcher and J. D. Ohlin, ‘Reclaiming Fundamental
Principles of Criminal Law in theDarfur Case’, (2005) 3 JICJ 539, at 554. Olasolo agreeswith this analysis and
further concludes that the standard that the ICTY actually applies in JCE III cases is the lower requirement
of recklessness based on reasonable foreseeability, not dolus eventualis. See Olasolo, supra note 29, at 175–6.
61 Art. 30 of the Rome Statute states that the default mental element, unless otherwise speciﬁed, is intent and
knowledge. Unfortunately, the Rome Statute’s deﬁnition of intent – ‘means to engage in the conduct’ and
‘means tocause thatconsequenceor isaware that itwilloccur in theordinarycourseofevents’ – isunderstood
radically different by common-law and civil-law criminal lawyers. To common-law lawyers, this deﬁnition
would be satisﬁed by the two mental elements – acting purposely and acting knowingly – that the Model
Penal Code used to replace the ambiguous notion of acting with intent. For a discussion of the relationship
between Art. 30 and dolus eventualis, see G. Werle and F. Jessberger, ‘“Unless Otherwise Provided”: Article 30
of the ICC Statute and theMental Element of Crimes under International Criminal Law’, (2005) 3 JICJ 35, at
52–3, concluding that Art. 30 excludes dolus eventualis as the default but that itmight be ‘otherwise provided’
as an appropriatemental element in other articles of the Rome Statute or even customary international law.
62 In this regard, see Stakic´, supra note 59, paras. 101–103.
63 Compare Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, supra note 48, paras. 366–369 (concluding on the basis of travaux
pre´paratoires that Rome Statute drafters dropped the idea of including recklessness or dolus eventualiswithin
Art. 30’s default mental element) with Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, supra note 26, paras. 352–353 (accepting dolus
eventualiswithin Art. 30’s default rule).
64 See Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, supra note 48, para. 351; Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, supra note 26, para. 344. For
a discussion, see T. Weigend, ‘Intent, Mistake of Law, and Co-Perpetration in the Lubanga Decision on
Conﬁrmation of Charges’, (2008) 6 JICJ 471, at 486.
65 In common law, a conspiracy is deﬁned as an agreement between two or more individuals to commit a
criminal or unlawful act. An agreement to commit a lawful act has never fallen within the ambit of the
conspiracy doctrine. For a discussion, see Ohlin, supra note 25, at 152.
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3.2. Does indirect co-perpetration require special justiﬁcation?
To put the matter in doctrinal terms, the doctrines of co-perpetration and indir-
ect perpetration have completely separate requirements. Co-perpetration based on
Roxin’s theory of domination over the act requires joint control over the act, with
eachmember providing an essential contribution, and eachmember’s knowledge of
the objective circumstances giving rise to this joint control.66 By contrast, indirect
perpetration based on Roxin’s theory requires either that the defendant use a sub-
ordinate individual who is deployed as an instrument to commit the crime or the
defendant has authority over a hierarchical and rule-governed organization whose
members, any one ofwhom is replaceable, carry out the crimesunder thehegemony
of the leader.67 The normative justiﬁcation for the vicarious liability is different
in each case. Although both are based on underlying principles of hegemony over
the act (Ta¨terschaft), one requires co-ordinated behaviour based on a joint intention
(excepting dolus eventualis), while the other requires something quite different: im-
posingone’swilluponanother individualoruponanorganization thatonecontrols.
In such a case, the physical perpetrator’s will is either completely eviscerated or at
the very least subordinated to the will of the indirect perpetrator (Hintermann).68 In
contrast, co-perpetration involves co-operative activity.69 These are quite different
phenomena, each of which bears its ownmoral rationale for criminal liability.70
So, one might object that no special or additional justiﬁcation is required for
combining indirect perpetration and co-perpetration. Indeed, courts have occasion-
ally claimed that applying indirect co-perpetration requires that the prosecution
demonstrate that the requirements of both modes of liability have been met. This
boils down to ﬁnding that the defendant was a co-perpetrator by virtue of his joint
control over the crime and was an indirect perpetrator by virtue of his use of a
vertical organization. In theory, this objection is sound but, in practice, the ICC has
not followed these requirements. In Katanga and Chui, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber
(PTC) suggested that each defendant could be held responsible for the totality of the
conduct performed by both vertical organizations –which, when combined, consti-
tute an international crime. This implies that Katanga can be held vicariously liable
for the actions of Chui’s vertical organization, and Chui can be held vicariously
liable for Katanga’s vertical organization. However, the court also suggested that
each defendant only had direct control over his or her own vertical organization. It
is therefore not the case that both Katanga and Chui each satisﬁed the demands of
the indirect-perpetration doctrine.
66 See, e.g., Roxin, supranote 31, at x; G. P. Fletcher,RethinkingCriminal Law (2000), 655–7;Thomas LubangaDyilo,
supra note 26, paras. 330–332; Olasolo, supra note 29, at 36 (discussing Roxin and his predecessor,Welzel).
67 See Roxin, supra note 35, at 200–1; Ambos, supra note 32, at 149–50; Olasolo, supra note 29, at 116–18; G.
Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law (2009), 178–80.
68 Scholars disagree over whether a conviction for indirect perpetration requires that the physical perpetrator
havehisculpabilitynegatedduetohis lackofautonomy.RoxinarguedthatOrganisationsherrschaftconstituted
an exception to this rule, knownas the autonomyprinciple, because indirect perpetrationwas not limited to
cases inwhich the physical perpetrator wasmistaken or coerced. See Roxin, supra note 35, at 196–7; Olasolo,
supranote 29, at 117; Ambos supranote 32, at 148; Schroeder, supranote 35. TheRomeStatute has deﬁnitively
rejected the autonomy principle requirement in Art. 25(3)(a).
69 See, generally, G. P. Fletcher, ‘New Court, OldDogmatik’, (2011) 9 JICJ 179.
70 See Ambos, supra note 32, at 153.
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The application of indirect co-perpetration by the Trial Chamber in Stakic´ repre-
sents another innovative application of the doctrine where the defendant does not
have control over the vertical organization whose members physically perpetrate
the crimes. This further suggests that the doctrine cannot simply be justiﬁed by the
fact that the requirements for both sub-doctrines are established for each defendant.
Stakic´, as amunicipal ofﬁcial, was in control of his local civilian bureaucracy,which
the court found was required for logistical support of the other vertical branches
that physically perpetrated the crimes. But themembers of the civilian bureaucracy
did not physically perpetrate any of the crimes – the other vertical organizations did
that. It is therefore not the case that Stakic´ personallymet the requirements for both
indirect and co-perpetration.
In each case, if the respective court had required fulﬁlment of all requirements of
each doctrine, then cross-vicarious liability for acts performed by each other’s ver-
tical organizations could only be justiﬁed by joint control over both organizations,
which the court said did not exist in this case. However, none of this suggests that
indirect co-perpetration is fundamentally unsupportable. Rather, it simply suggests
that the new hybrid doctrine requires its own justiﬁcation, since, in reality, the
doctrine exceeds the reach of what co-perpetration and indirect perpetration can
accomplish independentlyofeachother.Speciﬁcally, if the ICCcanapply indirectco-
perpetration to cases inwhich the defendant does not share control over the vertical
organization that physically perpetrates the crimes, then there is no shortage of geo-
metrical possibilities, including an inverted-L-shaped structure of vicarious liability.
The ICC’s recent Pre-Trial judgments in theKenyan case represent another innov-
ative geometrical possibility for indirect co-perpetration.71 In Muthaura et al., the
Chamber held that crimes against humanity were committed by members of the
Mungiki, a ‘hierarchical and organized apparatus of power’. However, the PTC was
inconsistent in its statements about who controlled the vertical operation. The PTC
ﬁrst stated that Njenga ‘possessed exclusive control’ over the organization,72 but
then later contradicted this statement by concluding that control was transferred to
Muthaura and Kenyatta, even though ‘Njenga continued to act as the Mungiki top
leader while in detention’.73 Once again, this appears to be another case in which
the relationship between the co-perpetrators and their ‘control’ over the vertical
organization in question remains utterly obscure. HowdidNjengamanage to retain
control over theMungikiwhile in detention if he transferred ultimate control of the
organization to Kenyatta andMuthaura? Either Njenga exercised exclusive control
or he did not. If he did, thenKenyatta andMuthaura did not independentlymeet the
standards for indirect perpetration. It is therefore false to suggest that the ICC only
applies indirect co-perpetration in cases in which all of the requirements of each
underlyingmode of liability are established.
71 See Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Decision on Conﬁrmation of Charges,
ICC-01/09-02/11, P.T.Ch. II, 23 January 2012.
72 Ibid., paras. 190, 361.
73 Ibid., para. 368.
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4. THE PERSONALITY PRINCIPLE
The question then becomes: what type of argument can bemarshalled to justify the
combination of a horizontal linking principle with a vertical linking principle? In
this section, I suggest that the missing element in such an argument can only be
providedby a second-order linkingprinciple. Theprinciple is ‘second-order’ because
it is a linking principle that itself links two other linking principles (the modes of
liability) and therefore represents a higher-order or meta-level linking principle.74
Without such an implicit second-order linking principle, there would be no reason
to allow the linking of the ﬁrst-order linking principles.
First, an objection: the second-order linking principle is unnecessary because
we need a convincing account of co-perpetration, nothing more. In this vein, a
convincing account of co-perpetration would explain the nature of horizontal co-
operation and also provide a normative justiﬁcation for the attribution of liability
to each co-conspirator. Is that not the point of having a co-perpetration doctrine in
the ﬁrst place?
To answer this objection, it is important to distinguish the nature of the attribu-
tion incasesof indirect co-perpetration.Thesecasesdomore thansimplyvicariously
attribute the acts of co-perpetrators to the defendant. That is what happens in cases
of garden-variety co-perpetration. But cases of indirect co-perpetration involve a
form of double vicarious attribution. The act of the RPP is ﬁrst vicariously attributed
to the indirect perpetrator and then, as a second step, the indirect perpetrator’s vi-
carious liability is attributed to the other co-perpetrators. In a sense, it is inaccurate
to say that the other co-perpetrators are held vicariously liable for the criminal acts
of the indirect perpetrator – because the relevant crimes are actually committed by
the members of the hierarchical organization, not by the indirect perpetrator. The
moreprecise formulation is that the indirect perpetrator’s vicarious responsibility is
attributed, in a form of double vicarious responsibility, to his other co-perpetrators
residing at the horizontal level. This is more than just a case of co-perpetration,
because co-perpetration only provides a normative justiﬁcation for vicarious re-
sponsibility of the criminal acts committed by co-perpetrators. In other words, in
cases of indirect co-perpetration, the other co-perpetrator has not performed the
relevant crime. So the doctrine does more than just combine a mode of liability
with a substantive crime – it combines one mode of liability with another mode
of liability and then with a substantive crime. This brings us back to the present
inquiry, namely that some second-order linking principle must justify the linkage
of the modes of liability.
Whatwould this second-order linking principle look like? In the present section,
I argue that the second-order linkingprinciplemust emphasize the collectivenature
of the horizontal group – what I call the personality principle. In theory, there are
otherprinciples that couldbedescribedas second-orderprinciples, butnoneof them
74 Thephrase ‘second-order’hasbeenusedinmanyothertheoreticalcontexts,althoughnotwithinthescholarly
literature on JCE or indirect co-perpetration. For a famous example, see H. G. Frankfurt, ‘Freedomof theWill
and the Concept of the Person’, (1971) 68 Journal of Philosophy 5, at 8–10 (distinguishing second-order desires
from ﬁrst-order desires).
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provides a normative reason to support the vicarious liability of acts committed
along the vertical axis.75
Themost plausible candidate for a second-order linking principle is based on the
notion of personality.76 Under this principle, the co-perpetrators at the leadership
level constitute a joint agent, such that the indirect perpetration by one leader is
directly attributable to the collective agent that is devoted to a particular criminal
goal.77 One could refer to this collective agent as a legal person, a group agent,
or an organization, though there is nothing essential about these terminological
choices.78 Sufﬁce it to say that the horizontal leaders function as a collective, and
leave the nature of that collective to the side for themoment. The term ‘personality
principle’ is meant to capture that collective nature and nothingmore.
There are strong reasons for preferring the personality principle as the rele-
vant second-order linking principle. By analogy, much of Roxin’s control theory is
based on the notion that the relevant unit is the organized power apparatus that
the indirect perpetrator uses to commit the crime.79 The notion of Organisations-
herrschaft implies, obviously, a kind of collective entity.80 Other German scholars,
such as Dencker, have gone even further and suggested that the organization itself
is the primary and irreducible organ for the purposes of attributing the criminal
action and the resulting liability.81 Indeed, one way of interpretingmy thesis is that
something resembling Dencker’s Zurechnungsprinzip Gesamttat (collective imput-
ation principle), or what I havemore generally described as a personality principle,
is implicitly but necessarily relied upon as a second-order linking principle in cases
of combined vertical–horizontal group liability such as indirect co-perpetration (or
leadership-level JCE combined with a vertical mode of liability).82
Of course, the issue is what the general principle will look like and how it relates
to themorespeciﬁccriminal-lawdoctrines.Amboshasargued that themodelsought
75 Onemight, for example, appeal to the principle of transitivity. Butwith regard tomodes of liability generally,
it cannot be the case that the principle of transitivity always applies. Assume that A aids B in his criminal
endeavour. B then aids C in his criminal endeavour. Does that fact alonemakeA an accomplice to the crimes
of C? With no additional facts added, A would not be an accomplice to C. Liability would only attach if it
could be shown that A’s assistance to B was, in some way, also assistance to C’s endeavour. In the absence of
such a fact, A remains derivatively liable for B’s crime, B remains derivatively liable for C’s crimes, but A is
not derivatively liable for C’s crimes.
76 See, generally, A. Eser and F. Rettenmaier, ‘Criminality of Organizations: Lessons from Domestic Law: A
Comparative Perspective’, in A. Nollkaemper and H. van der Wilt (eds.), System Criminality in International
Law (2009), 222.
77 Dencker’s Zurechnungsprinzip Gesamttat (collective imputation principle) gestures in this direction as well.
See F. Dencker, Kausalita¨t und Gesamttat (1996), arguing that the criminal enterprise constitutes the central
object of attribution. Indeed, one way of interpreting my thesis is that something resembling Dencker’s
Zurechnungsprinzip Gesamttat (collective imputation principle), or what I havemore generally described as a
personality principle, is implicitly but necessarily relied upon as a second-order linking principle in cases of
combined vertical–horizontal group liability such as indirect co-perpetration or leadership JCE combined
with a vertical mode of liability.
78 In another context, see also C. List and P. Pettit, Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate
Agents (2011), 157.
79 See Roxin, supra note 31, at 249.
80 Ibid., at 246.
81 See Dencker, supra note 77. Although Dencker’s theories have not been applied by international courts, Kai
Ambos hasmade extensive reference to them in his work. See, e.g., K. Ambos, ‘Joint Criminal Enterprise and
Command Responsibility’, (2007) 5 JICJ 159, at 168.
82 Dencker, supra note 77.
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to be separated so that one doctrine deals with the collective accountability of the
organization and another doctrine deals with individual responsibility, though, in
truth, neither is mutually exclusive.83 The issue of exclusivity is paramount here,
because critics often worry that theories of collective liability will obfuscate the
individual’s personal culpability, either by inﬂating it through guilt by association
or by deﬂating it throughmitigation.84 But, as the foregoing analysis demonstrates,
recognition of the collectivist impulse behind indirect co-perpetration is essential
if we are to zealously guard the principle of individual culpability.
In essence, the personality principle, like Dencker’s collective imputation prin-
ciple, is the deeper andmore abstract principle that resides behind themore speciﬁc
criminal-law doctrines that are being applied by international courts. It is already
commonplaceforscholarstorecognizethecollectivenatureofRoxin’stheoriesalong
thevertical axis.However, the relevant collective entity for thepurposes ofOrganisa-
tionsherrschaft resides along the vertical axis, namely the hierarchical organization
that exhibits rule-governed processes.85 In the case of combined horizontal–vertical
liability, though, the group entity in question is a leadership enterprise along the
horizontal axis.86 This article is simply a plea to recognize the importance of the
principle that is operating along the horizontal axis.
Might we extend the metaphor of personality or collectivism that is implied
in Organisationsherrschaft and then simply apply it to the horizontal context at the
leadership level?Theremight be strong factual arguments to support this extension.
First, members of a leadership-level JCE are dedicated to a particular criminal goal.
Theyoftendeliberateandengageincollectivedecision-makingbygatheringrelevant
evidence, deliberating in common, and selecting a course of action. The decision-
making might be pursued democratically, or not. Regardless, though, the members
of a leadership JCE not only co-ordinate their actions, they also co-ordinate their
reasons to such a degree that theymight be considered a group agent, a legal person,
a collective.
Nothinghingesonwhether youcall the leadership-level JCE– the co-perpetrators
– a legal person, a group agent, an enterprise, or even a conspiracy. The real issue
here is whether some aspect of the collective nature of the group at the top of
the hierarchy is sufﬁciently robust that it justiﬁes treating the collectivity as the
83 K. Ambos, ‘Zur “Organisation” bei der Organisationsherrschaft’, inM. Heinrich, C. Ja¨ger, and B. Schu¨nemann
(eds.), Festschrift fu¨r Claus Roxin zum 80. Geburtstag am 15. Mai 2011 (2011), 852.
84 CompareG. P. Fletcher and J. D. Ohlin,DefendingHumanity (2008), 186–7,with J.McMahan, ‘Collective Crime
andCollective Punishment’,Criminal Justice Ethics (2008), 9. Collectivemitigationmeans that the individual’s
participation in the collective effort provides a reason to reduce the culpability, and perhaps punishment, of
the individual, since the culpability is shared amonga larger groupof individuals. Several scholars, including
McMahan, are sceptical of collectivist theories because theymight imply fallacious results like precisely this
kind of mitigation.
85 See, e.g., Ambos, supra note 32, at 148 (‘Be that as it may, the traditional system of individual responsibility,
as applied for ordinary criminality characterized by the individual commission of single crimes, must be
adaptedto theneedsof internationalcriminal lawaimingat thedevelopmentofamixedsystemof individual-
collective responsibility in which the criminal enterprise or an organization as a whole serves as the entity
uponwhich attribution of criminal responsibility is based’). However, the collective entity to which Ambos
refers is the vertical organization.
86 See Burghardt and Werle, supra note 36, at 863 (recognizing the existence of a corporate entity in cases of
joint indirect perpetration).
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relevant unit of attribution, such that the vertical axis – the indirect perpetration –
can be attributed not just to the individual in control of the vertical organization,
but to the entire horizontal collective. Might the personality principle provide this
justiﬁcation?
There are strong prudential reasons for supporting this view. It would be odd if
a co-ordinated division of labour on the horizontal axis (with one member’s taking
responsibility for control of the vertical axis) should immunize the non-indirect
perpetrators from vicarious responsibility for the acts of the physical perpetrators.
As a matter of policy, adopting such a view might encourage political leaders to
encourage horizontal division of labour in this manner so as to preserve plausible
deniability on their part.87 The result might be more – rather than fewer – war
crimes and atrocities committed using the inverted-L-shaped structure. For some
international jurists, this observation alone might be sufﬁcient to justify the use of
indirect co-perpetration as a mode of liability.
On the contrary, though, it is imperative that we justify the mode of liability on
theoretical and normative grounds, in addition to policy-oriented consequentialist
grounds. The personality principle implies that the collective nature of the hori-
zontal leadership – including its rational integration, meshing of sub-plans, and
joint intentions – provides a reason for attributing the indirect control to all mem-
bers of the group. Again, acceptance of the principle does not require positing legal
personality for the horizontal group; such a resultwould be resisted by lawyerswho
are suspicious of the concept of legal personhood for corporate bodies.88 Theperson-
ality principle simply requires that we take the collective nature of the horizontal
group seriously enough such thatwe can legally conclude that the horizontal group
as a whole directs the vertical axis, even if, as a factual matter, the indirect control is
exercised by one constituent part (i.e., member) of the leadership collective. Other
scholars have started to gesture in this direction as well.89
This provides a plausible roadmap for justifying horizontal–vertical liability
in some instances. Consider, for example, the Pre-Trial Chamber’s conclusion in
Katanga that an:
individual who has no control over the person through whom the crime would be
committed cannot be said to commit the crime by means of that other person. How-
ever, if he acts jointly with another individual – who controls the person used as an
instrument– these crimes canbeattributed tohimon thebasis ofmutual attribution.90
The notion of mutual attribution to the entire leadership level is theoretically
plausible (and normatively defensible) if the leadership level is understood as a
collective. The personality principle provides a much-needed, second-order linking
principle here that acts as a foundation for the substantive doctrine to operate.
87 See Vest, supra note 52, at 428.
88 Cf. F. K. von Savigny, System des heutigen ro¨mischen Rechts (1840), 283.
89 See Vest, supra note 52, at 428, citing G. Heine, Taeterschaft und Teilnahme in staatlichenMatchapparaten (2000),
920.Vest suggests that leadership-leveldefendants shouldbeconvictedas ‘system-functional co-perpetrators’
of a common criminal endeavour, regardless of whether that endeavour is characterized as an instance of
JCE I or co-perpetration.
90 SeeGermain Katanga andMathieu Ngudjolo Chui, supra note 27, para. 493.
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Without it, themutual attribution is downrightmysterious. Recall again that this is
a case of double vicarious liability, and that simply appealing to co-perpetration will
not justify the double vicarious liability of these situations.
If thepersonalityprinciple is the guiding force behind thisnew formof combined
horizontal–vertical liability, thereare importantdoctrinal consequences toconsider.
Liability is appropriate in cases inwhich each leadership-level co-perpetratormain-
tains his own hierarchical organization that physically perpetrates the crimes. Li-
ability is also appropriate in cases in which a corporate entity or a junta directs the
vertical hierarchical organization. However, principal liability would be inappro-
priate in cases inwhich the individuals at the leadership level do not rise to the level
of a collective entity – at least not for the individuals who do not control their own
hierarchical organization.91 For example, cases that involve a simple overlapping
of interlinked JCEs – and nothing more – would not meet this criterion. In this
situation, the second-order linking principle would be lacking.
The question is how one distinguishes between, on the one hand, bona ﬁde
cases of corporate action and, on the other, a mere aggregation of individuals.92 The
doctrine as it is currently applied in the international case law does not provide a
standard with which to answer this question.93 Although some ideas might be bor-
rowed from the doctrine ofOrganisationsherrschaft, it is important to remember that
Roxin’s theory was tailor-made for vertical organizational relationships and cannot
be mechanically applied to the horizontal axis. For example, vertical organizations
are characterized, according to Roxin, by each individual member’s fungibility; if
one member of the hierarchy departs or refuses to complete his task, another one
takes his place as a matter of course.94 In contrast, horizontal partnerships, which
Roxin analyses as cases of co-perpetration simpliciter, are characterized according to
the ICC by the exact opposite: each perpetrator is essential to the task’s completion
and their withdrawal would frustrate the plan’s success.95 Vertical and horizontal
organizations are fundamentally different.96
This last point suggests an objection. Is the control theory of perpetration sufﬁ-
cient by itself to provide an account of the horizontal organization?97 Under this
view, the horizontal organization is a case of co-perpetration pure and simple, as
the ICC analysed in its most recent cases. However, co-perpetration leaves many
fundamental questions unanswered with regard to joint control over a vertical
91 It is important to note that the issue at hand is not whether the defendant could be convicted simpliciter, but
whether the defendant could be convicted as a principal. No one doubts that, in the situation just described,
the individual at the leadership level would be guilty, at the very least, as an accomplice.
92 See G. P. Fletcher, ‘Strafrecht ohne Strafta¨ter’, in Heinrich, Ja¨ger, and Schu¨nemann, supra note 83, at 793.
93 Ibid., at 797–8.
94 C. Roxin, ‘Organisationsherrschaft und Tatentschlossenheit’, Zeitschrift fu¨r internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik
(2006), 296 (discussingFungibilita¨tskriterium); seealsoAmbos, supranote32, at154–5 (distinguishingbetween
negative and positive interchangeability); Weigend, supra note 64, at 97 (discussing fungibility).
95 See Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, supra note 26, para. 346 (essential contribution as an objective element of co-
perpetration). For analysis, seeWeigend, supra note 64, at 480 (describing the ICC’s position of an ‘essential’
contribution as an intermediate position between ‘promoting’ and ‘necessary’ contribution).
96 Cf. Ambos, supra note 32, at 153 (discussing ‘structural difference between vertical indirect perpetration and
horizontal co-perpetration’).
97 Cf. M. Bohlander, Principles of German Criminal Law (2009), 161 (Mitta¨terschaft as analogous to enterprise
liability).
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organization, as this article has previously identiﬁed. These questions include, inter
alia, what it means for several individuals to exercise joint control over a vertical
organization that reports to one commander. The control theory and, by exten-
sion, co-perpetration do not directly answer this question, in part because neither
takes seriously the horizontal organization itself as the primary unit of action and
responsibility. This blind spot is all the more curious given the obsession with
organizational dynamics inherent in Organisationsherrschaft. Therefore, this article
argues that a deeper principle regarding the horizontal collective – what I call the
personality principle – is doing at least part of the justiﬁcatory work in combining
vertical and horizontal modes of liability.
4.1. The incompleteness of joint control as an answer
The ICC has repeatedly invoked Roxin’s control theory as the basis for its inter-
pretation of co-perpetration under Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute.98 However,
the control theory – by itself – cannot answer the question of why the attribution
of indirect perpetration liability is appropriate to all members of the horizontal
collective.
First, if one takes Roxin’s theory as a starting point, the question is about joint
control or hegemony over the act.99 If ultimate decision-making authority rests
with one individual in a leadership group, then he exercises the hegemony; he de-
cides whether the hierarchical organization will physically perpetrate the crimes;
he follows or disregards the advice of his lieutenants; he overrules their operational
micro-decisions when he considers them ill-advised. Under these criteria, the lead-
ership group lacks personality in the relevant sense because ultimate control rests
with an individual, not the group. Consequently, the other members of the leader-
ship group are really just mid-level subordinates residing one level below the true
Hintermann.100 The irony here is that, under this view, even Eichmann – the inspir-
ation for Roxin’s theory –would not have qualiﬁed as having ultimate control, since
his decisions were subject to overrule by the Fu¨hrer and he was replaceable if he
stepped aside.101
Most of the cases that have already applied vertical–horizontal liability, either
at the ICTY or at the ICC, have asserted that the leaders exercised joint control
98 See, most recently, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Trial Chamber Judgement, ICC-01/04–01/06, T.Ch. I,
14March 2012, para. 994.
99 Fletcher, supra note 69, at 190.
100 Cf. Ambos, supra note 32, at 151 (noting that the Israel Supreme Court applied indirect perpetration below
the leadership level).
101 Compare Roxin, supra note 35, at 199–201, with K. Ambos, ‘Command Responsibility and Organisations-
herrschaft: Ways of Attributing International Crimes to the “Most Responsible”’, in A. Nollkaemper and H.
van derWilt (eds.), System Criminality in International Law (2009), 127, at 152–3 (expressing scepticism about
Eichmannas an indirect perpetrator). The ICCPre-TrialChamber, aswell as the ICTYTrialChamber inStakic´,
has concluded that a defendant’s contributions are indispensable if he could have frustrated the common
plan by alerting the authorities. See Stakic´, supra note 48, para. 490. This reasoning is fallacious because any
accomplice, or third parties with knowledge of a criminal plot, could alert the authorities and potentially
stop the plan from unfolding. This does not make an individual’s contribution indispensable on pain of a
reductio ad absurdum. If everyone is indispensable, then no one is. The same issue arises with irreplaceability;
even direct perpetrators can be deemed irreplaceable if there is no time to replace themwhen they refuse to
ﬁre their weapons. See Ambos, supra note 32, at 155.
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over the vertical organization, thus suggesting that both co-perpetrators are directly
linked to the vertical organization. This legal outcome rests heavily on the notion
of joint control and it is still unclear what it means for two or more individuals
to ‘jointly’ control a vertical organization. The recent cases that have applied the
concept of joint control have offered only conclusory and perfunctory analyses of
the phenomenon.
For example, in Stakic´, the ICTY Trial Chamber deﬁned joint control as a case in
which two or more individuals act together and one of them could frustrate the
plan by refusing to do his part.102 In applying this standard to joint control over
crimes committed by lower-level perpetrators, though, the Trial Chamber could
only muster a few short sentences, and none of them really addressed the issue of
joint control.103 Rather, the Trial Chamber stated that the crimes could not have
been committed without the assistance of the government bureaucracy controlled
by Stakic´, and that he could have frustrated the plan by withdrawing or reporting
the crimes.104 This only establishes that Stakic´’s contributionwas a sine qua non, not
thatheexercised joint controlover theverticalhierarchy thatphysicallyperpetrated
the crimes. The point about reporting is fallacious because there was no ofﬁce or
ofﬁcial to which Stakic´ could have reported the crimes. In Al Bashir, the Pre-Trial
Chamber analysed the president’s joint control in contradictory terms. The PTC
asserted that Al Bashir exercised joint control, with other high-ranking government
and military leaders, over members of the counterinsurgency forces, including the
Sudanese Armed Forces, the Janjaweed Militia, the Sudanese Police Forces, and
other groups.105 At the same time, however, the PTC concluded that the president
exercised ‘full control’ over the forces – a ﬁnding that substantially impairs the
notion of a junta composed of multiple indirect co-perpetrators.106 The very same
tension showsup in theKenya case aswell,with the court at onemoment saying that
Njenga had exclusive control and at anothermoment claiming that this control had
been transferred to two others; in neither situationwas the joint control sufﬁciently
explained.107
Of particular concern is the relative importance of two phenomena: deliber-
ation and decision-making. In some groups, individuals deliberate in common but
only one individual makes the decision. This includes, for example, a president
surrounded by a cabinet of advisers, or a mob boss supported by loyal lieutenants.
Although the group engages in collective deliberation, the ultimate authority to
make decisions – to control the vertical organization and its subordinates – rests
102 See Stakic´, supra note 48, para. 440 (quoting Roxin).
103 Ibid., para. 490.
104 Ibid., paras. 490–491.
105 See Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, supra note 46, paras. 216–223. For a discussion, see Osiel, supra note 29,
at 123 (noting disagreement over whether Bashir exercised total control). See also Vest, supra note 52, at 428
(uncertainty over Bashir’s full control).
106 Judge Anita Usˇacka dissented for this very reason, noting that ‘I do not ﬁnd any evidence which addresses
the issue of the locus of control; it is unclear whether such control indeed rested fully with Omar Al Bashir,
or whether it was shared by others such that each person had the power to frustrate the commission of
the crime’. See Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Usˇacka, para. 104 (rejecting indirect co-perpetration as a
proper basis for the warrant).
107 See Francis Kirimi Muthaura and UhuruMuigai Kenyatta, supra note 71, para. 186.
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with one individual. On the other hand, some groups collectivize both deliberation
and decision-making, such that the group represents a true junta model. No one
individual has ultimate authority tomakeﬁnal decisions. This organizational struc-
ture is rare because it is notoriously unstable.108 A true junta is likely to collapse
because no one individual has authority to overrule bickering generals. Are both
types of group legitimate targets for the application of indirect co-perpetration?109
If joint controlmeans that each individual has, byhimself, the power to direct the
activitiesoftheorganization, thenthenotionofindirectco-perpetrationis irrelevant,
sincebothindividualsareredundantindirectperpetrators. If jointcontrolmeansthat
neither individual has the sole authority to issue directives to the organization and
that both individuals must approve the directives, then very few factual situations
would ever qualify for this level of joint control.110 Such a scenario would only
exist in cases of a genuine co-presidency and, even then, each president usually has
some individual authority that does not require the consent of his co-president.
Finally, joint control might mean that both individuals belong to a collective body
that issues the decisions by virtue of some internal voting mechanism, which is
then relayed downwards by the military commander who belongs to the collective
body.111 In these situations, the vertical organization only responds to directives
that are lawfully issued in the name of the horizontal group and discards ultra vires
directives that violate the decision procedure of the horizontal group. The case
for liability in this ﬁnal situation largely depends on the corporate nature of the
horizontal collective.
None of this suggests that the control theory of perpetration is erroneous. Rather,
the preceding analysis simply demonstrates that the control theory, by itself, cannot
provide a rationale for combining vertical and horizontal modes of liability in
the manner in which the ICC has recently done. There is a missing link to the
argument – a deeper principle that lays the foundation for the connection between
the horizontal and vertical modes of liability. For convenience, I have called it the
personality principle.
108 A point Hobbes made quite famously in Leviathan, where he asserted that corporate bodies were always
subject to internal division while monarchs were not. See T. Hobbes, Leviathan (1994), 115–16.
109 It is imperative to recognize the correct structure of this argument. The task is not to determine on meta-
physical grounds that the entity qualiﬁes as a group agent and then mechanically draw moral or legal
conclusions from this analysis. Such an analysis would afford far too much signiﬁcance to metaphysical
concepts of personality or group agency. See J. D. Ohlin, ‘Is the Concept of the Person Necessary for Human
Rights?’, (2005) 105Columbia Law Review 209, at 238–40. Rather, the task is to determine, at the outset, the
moral and legal signiﬁcance of various forms of group action so as to make sensible conclusions regarding
vicarious liability for the acts of the RPP.
110 This could be described as a ‘turn-your-key’ model of joint control, in the sense that both marine ofﬁcers
on board a nuclear submarine must simultaneously turn their respective keys in order to launch a nuclear
weapon. This creates the imagined scenario, often hypothesized, inwhich one compliant ofﬁcerwould need
to threaten his recalcitrant colleague with a gun in order to get him to turn his key and co-launch a nuclear
retaliatory strike.
111 What if the relevant voting procedure is collective consultation and advice-giving followed by autocratic
decision-making by the president? This sounds more like a sole executive than a junta, yet the scholarly
consensus is that theBashir case involves a junta, even thoughhe retained executive control over the country.
The difference is relevant when one considers the liability of the other members of the alleged ‘junta’.
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4.2. The incompleteness of alternatemodels of co-perpetration
One might object that the justiﬁcation could be provided by an alternate account
of co-perpetration. In the past, I have argued that switching back to a subjectivist
theory could alleviate some of the problems associated with the control theory.112
A subjectivist approach would concentrate on themental states of the participants,
including their joint intention to commit the crime.113 Might the joint-intentions
theory provide a basis, without any deeper principle, for indirect co-perpetration?
If this were the case, it would demonstrate that the control theory is wrong but it
would not necessarily imply the need for a second-order linking principle.
If one adopts this subjectivist approach, the relevant question is whether the
members of the group exhibit a joint or shared intention that the hierarchical
organization be used to physically perpetrate the crimes.114 Although Roxin’s so-
called ‘functional objective’ approachwasmeant as an antidote to the long-standing
pendulum swing between formal–objective and subjective approaches, there is
much to recommend a general subjective orientation, notwithstanding the well-
known costs associated with this approach.115 Joint or shared intentions are the
mental building blocks of co-operative activity.116 Once individuals form a joint
intention, theycan formulate anoverall plan,makedecisions regarding strategy, and
then engage in the necessary predicate actions to bring the plan to fruition, which
may include farming out the physical perpetration to a vertical organization.117
Under this approach, the contours of vicarious liability at the horizontal level are
determined by which individuals share the joint intention to have the vertical
organization physically perpetrate the crimes.118 The warrant for supporting this
view is that all individuals with the joint intention exhibit a culpable mental state.
The joint-intentions theory is based, in part, on Bratman’s theory of joint co-
operative activity.119 Although there are several different formulations, the basic
buildingblocks of Bratman’s shared-intention thesis canbe reduced to the following
formula.We intend to J (joint activity) if and only if:
(1) (a) I intend that we J and (b) you intend that we J.
(2) I intend that we J in accordance with and because of (1)(a), (1)(b), and meshing
subplans of (1)(a) and (1)(b); you intend thatwe J in accordancewith andbecause
of (1)(a), (1)(b), andmeshing subplans of (1)(a) and (1)(b).
112 See Ohlin, supra note 29, at 747.
113 Ibid., at 742.
114 This view is presented in ibid., at 735 ff.
115 For problems with the subjective approach, see Weigend, supra note 64, at 480 (noting the possibility of
manipulation); Fletcher, supra note 66, at 657–8 (discussing Stashchynsky); Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, supra note
26, para. 329. However, the Model Penal Code generally takes a subjective approach that is more closely
attunedwith culpablemental states; see, e.g., MPC § 5.01, andWeigend notes that German courts in practice
have traditionally favoured a subjective approach.
116 See, generally, M. E. Bratman, Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency (1999), 93−129.
117 Ibid., at 125.
118 Cf. Ohlin, supra note 29, at 744.
119 See Bratman, supra note 116, at 115.
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(3) (1) and (2) are common knowledge between us.120
Bratman’s theory provides a model for co-operative activity based on the unique
intentional structure demonstrated by the underlying commitments that are neces-
sary to bring these plans to fruition. Participants in these joint activities participate
in such endeavours because the participants share an intention that the individuals
worktogether toproducethedesiredresult;oftenthisprocessrequiresco-ordination,
division of labour, and what Bratman calls ‘the meshing of subplans’, or, in more
colloquial terms, the manner in which the joint activity will be executed.121
Thejoint-intentionstheoryclearlyprovidesasubjectivistglossonco-perpetration
that is deeply compelling. Co-perpetrators of international crimes are vicariously
liable for the crimes committed by their co-perpetrators if and only if the co-
perpetrators shared a joint intention that one of themcommit the crime in question.
If one of the co-perpetrators extends beyond the criminal plan and commits a rogue
action, the other co-perpetrators are not liable because the participants do not share
a joint intention to commit the wayward crime.122
But the question is whether the joint-intentions theory is sufﬁciently robust to
ground the types of indirect co-perpetration applied by the ICC.Once again, though,
it is clear that a doctrinal account of co-perpetration is, by itself, insufﬁcient to jus-
tify the attribution of the vertical mode of liability to all members of the horizontal
axis. Like the control theory, the joint-intentions theory provides a similarly incom-
plete justiﬁcation for the attribution of a vertical mode of liability to a horizontal
collective.
As a ﬁnal point, joint control and joint intentions do not exhaust the possible
models for co-perpetration – there are other possible models. For example, one
could develop a theory of co-perpetration that is based on the rational relationships
between the members of the group and emphasizes the role of deliberation in the
formation of collective plans. Speciﬁcally, this ‘collective-reason’ approach would
emphasize the rational relationship between the members of the horizontal group.
Under this view, a group of individuals is uniﬁed in the relevant sense when they
collectivize reason.
Collective rationality is not a vague concept, but insteadhas a distinct andunique
structure that can be precisely identiﬁed.123 It emerges when a group of individuals
become committed to overall rational unity on a particular issue.124 Contradictions
among the group are seen as rational inconsistencies that ought to be resolved,
if possible, in much the same way as single individuals believe that rationality
demands that contradictions in their ownbeliefs anddesires ought to be resolved.125
120 Ibid., at 119.
121 Ibid., at 95–8.
122 See Ohlin, supra note 29, at 744–5.
123 See, e.g., L. A. Kornhauser and L. G. Sager, ‘The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts’, (1993)
81CLR 1, at 10–13 (applying the discursive dilemma to legal contexts); C. List, ‘The Discursive Dilemma
and Public Reason’, (2006) 116 Ethics 362, at 398 (‘structure of individual judgments underdetermines the
appropriate decision at the collective level’).
124 See C. Rovane, The Bounds of Agency: An Essay in RevisionaryMetaphysics (1998), 144–5.
125 Ibid., at 146.
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This collective rationality is particularly important when a group decides on a
course of action and uses means–end reasoning to determine the appropriate steps
to achieve that goal. The difference between a mere aggregation of individuals
and a bona ﬁde group exercising collective reason is that aggregate individualswith
divergentbeliefswillnotunderstandthemascontradictionsthatdemandresolution.
They will simply be understood as disagreements. So, under the ‘collective-reason’
view, only horizontal groups that exercise collective reason will have the relevant
decision-making structure that allows forvicarious liability for thegroup’s direction
of the vertical hierarchical organization. The warrant for this conclusion is that the
commitment to overall rational unity entails that it is really the group itself – not
an individual – that is directing the affairs of the vertical organization.
It would be a mistake to view collective rationality as a simple aggregation of
individual human beings engaged in individual rationality, namely a legal ﬁction
or shorthand used to describe a large number of individuals. Under this view, the
collectivewould have no independent signiﬁcance. This argument ismistaken. The
social-choice literature has amply explained that groups display a unique rational
structure that cannot be re-described as an aggregation of individual rationality.
Consider a group of individuals deciding how to proceedwith a given endeavour
– an endeavour that can be broken down to a smaller set of decisions. One strategy
is for each member of the group to individually reason towards a conclusion and
then vote (or use some alternate decision procedure) on the outcome based on each
individual’s conclusion. There is, however, a second strategy that is farmoreholistic.
The group as a whole can collectively decide each sub-question and then, at the end
of the inquiry, let the sub-questions decide the outcome of the inquiry. If the group
adopts this procedure – a formof collective reason – it cannot be explained as a large
aggregationof individual decisions. It is, as itwere, a formof collective rationality.126
Butevencollectiverationalitydoesnotprovideacompletenormativejustiﬁcation
for indirect perpetration; it simply provides a competitor to joint control and joint
intentionality as the relevant yardstick for co-perpetration. What is needed is the
missing link that explains how the vertical mode of liability can be attributed, not
just to a single individual, but to an entire horizontal collective.
4.3. The collectivist impulse
The answer to this question is to dig deeper and emphasize what all three of these
accounts have in common: a collectivist impulse. Joint control, joint intentions,
and collective rationality are all doctrines that rely, implicitly, on a collective inter-
pretation of horizontal co-operation; the doctrines differ only in how they describe
that co-operation and the standards they use to measure it. If we step back from
these debates for a moment and view the issue from a higher level of abstraction,
it becomes clear that the collective nature of the horizontal leadership group is a
common element of each of these accounts. It is the foundation upon which the
more speciﬁc doctrinal differences are built.
126 See P. Pettit, ‘Collective Persons and Powers’, (2002) 8 Legal Theory 443.
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The collective nature of the horizontal group is precisely what I have described
as a second-order linking principle. For convenience, I have described that collective
principleas the ‘personalityprinciple’ soas to invokeandhighlight thegroup-agency
qualities of the leadership-level group. But there is nothing essential about the
language of personhood, and it does not entail a particularmoral or legal conclusion
about the moral worth of the leadership-level group. It simply ascribes collective
agency and responsibility in just the same way as corporate personhood describes
the legal andmoral agency of Shell or Exxon.
Another way of describing the personality principle is to invoke the language of
organizations–a terminologyalreadyusedbyRoxin todescribe thecollectivenature
of the vertical organization. In a similar vein, invoking the personality principle to
explain the application of indirect co-perpetration means that we should also de-
scribe the leadership-level defendants as a collective organization – an entity with
its own decision-making structure and a distinctive set of intentional states among
itsmembers. Vest gestures in a similar directionwhenhe describes these defendants
as ‘system-functional co-perpetrators’ – the notion of the ‘system’ embodies a col-
lective approach to the issue.127 When we shift from viewing the leadership-level
defendants as bare individuals to a bona ﬁde collective, the attribution of indirect
perpetration to all of them becomes all the more justiﬁable. This shift in thinking
can be seen in the recent Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgement when the court noted
that ‘[n]one of the participants exercises, individually, control over the crime as a
whole but, instead, the control over the crime falls in the hands of a collective as
such’.128 If the collective nature of the horizontal group is playing a large role in the
argument, thenweneed to start describing thehorizontal groupusing the collective
language of organizations or legal persons.
This naturally leads to a ﬁnal objection regarding the personality principle.
Criminal-law scholars are naturally and justiﬁably protective of the principle of
culpability and its cardinal demand that punishment be strictly tailored to each
defendant’s individual blameworthiness. In that sense, all good criminal lawyers are
individualists. Does the personality principle, as outlined in this article, threaten
the principle of individual culpability (or Schuldprinzip) by allowing for guilt by
association and thereby transgressing the fundamentally individualized nature of
the criminal law?
The objection is misplaced. Far from promoting guilt by association, the per-
sonality principle guards against it by rendering explicit the collective nature of
international crimes and the role of collectivism in the substantive doctrines ap-
plied by international courts. It is precisely for this reason that some of the most
zealous guardians of the principle of culpability – think of George Fletcher, Mark
Osiel, ormyself – have spilled somuch ink analysing doctrines of collective crimin-
ality in international criminal law, whether conspiracy, JCE, or co-perpetration.129
127 See Vest, supra note 52, at 428.
128 See Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, supra note 98, para. 994.
129 See, generally, G. P. Fletcher, ‘The Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem of Collective
Guilt’, (2002) 111 Yale Law Journal 1499; see also M. Osiel, Making Sense of Mass Atrocity (2009), 95–102;
Fletcher and Ohlin, supra note 60, at 542–5.
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Given the irreducibly collectivenature of international criminal behaviour, it is best
to acknowledge the normative work performed by the personality principle so that
scholars and judges can properly police its ﬁdelity to the principle of individual
culpability.
5. CONCLUSION
If the personality principle is indeed the second-order linking principle behind
combined vertical–horizontal modes of liability, international courts must develop
and apply a workable theory to determine when the horizontal group is collective
in the right sense. This issue applies not just in junta cases, but also inKatanga- and
Stakic´-type cases inwhich thedefendant isheld responsible for the crimesphysically
perpetrated by another leader’s vertical organization. Both types of case require the
second-order linkingprinciple–thepersonalityprinciple–tohelpjustifythelinkage
of indirect perpetration with co-perpetration.
In future cases, the ICC should do more to elucidate the collective nature of the
horizontal group and not just rely on a few conclusory remarks about joint control
– a standard that was developed by Roxin for co-perpetration and not indirect co-
perpetration per se. A more advisable course of action would be to consider what
makes a horizontal group collective in the relevant sense for ascribing criminal
liability to all indirect co-perpetrators. The pertinent question is: what is collectiv-
ized? Is it collective control, collective intention, or collective reason?To answer this
question, we ﬁrst need to take the horizontal group seriously.130 There are plausible
theories already developed in other disciplines – economics, philosophy, political
science, and psychology – but they need to be reimported into the criminal law.
A generation ago, Roxin developed Organisationsherrschaft to analyse the structure
of vertical organizations and its implications for perpetration. Now this generation
needs a doctrine for horizontal ones. In other words, we need more than just a the-
ory of indirect perpetration through an organization. We need a theory of indirect
perpetration by an organization – a theory that does not completely dissolve the
individual into the collectivemass, but charts the horizontal relationships between
its members.
130 See Fletcher, supra note 92, at 798.
